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Summary findings
Laeven examines the effect of product and geographic  high levels. Geographic diversification is valuable at low
diversification on firm value for a sample of 1,914  levels, however.
corporations in 18 countries. His results indicate that  The author finds that insider ownership is associated
both product and geographic diversification destroy  with less diversification, across both product and
value at high levels of diversification, suggesting that  geographic segments, suggesting that insiders view
agency and influence costs arising from the increased  corporate diversification as value destroying.
complexity outweigh the benefits of diversification at
This paper-a  product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is  part of a larger effort in the department
to study corporate financing problems around the world. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Rose Vo, room MC9-624,  telephone 202-473-3722,  fax 202-522-
2031,  email address hvol@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working  Papers are  also posted  on  the  Web at  http://
econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org.  December 2001.  (34 pages)
The Poicy Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or  the
countries  they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterInternational  Evidence on the Value of Product  and Geographic  Diversity
Luc Laeven*
The World Bank
JEL Classification: F23, G3, L2
* The World  Bank,  Financial  Sector  Vice  Presidency,  Room  MC 9-620, 1818  H Street,  20009  Washington,
DC,  tel. 2024582939,  fax.  202-5222031,  llaevenAworldbank.or2.1. Introduction
Research on the value of corporate diversification has focused on diversification
across industries. However, in addition to diversifying across lines of business, firms can
also diversify their activities across national boundaries. In this paper we consider both
forms of diversification simultaneously for a large number of firms in different countries.
If investment opportunities differ across countries, then it should be  true that excess
values  of  conglomerates can  be  partly  explained by  geographic diversification,  in
addition  to  industrial  diversification.  Differentiating  across  industries  only  could
therefore produce biased results of the effect of corporate diversification on firm value.
Previous work has  shown that  investrnent opportunities indeed tend to  differ across
countries  (see  the  evidence in  Fauver  et al.  (1998), Lins  and  Servaes  (1999), and
Claessens et al. (1999b)). Therefore, it is necessary to include the geographic component
into research on the value of corporate diversification.
Using data on 1,914 corporations from 18 countries we find that both geographic
and product diversification destroy value at high levels of diversification, suggesting that
agency and influence costs arising from increased complexity outweigh the benefits of
diversification at high degrees of diversification. Geographic diversification is found to
be valuable, however, at low levels of diversification. We also find that insider ownership
is related to less diversification, suggesting that insiders view corporate diversification as
value destroying.
Our work is closely related to Bodnar et al. (1997) who examine the simultaneous
effect of geographic and  industrial diversification on  firm value  for a sample of US
corporations.  They  find  that  product  diversification destroys  firm  value  and  that
geographic diversification enhanced firm value. We extend the study in Bodnar et al.
(1997) by using a sample that includes firms from a large number of countries and by
considering the effects of insider ownership on excess firm value in  an international
context. We therefore contribute to the literature by providing international evidence on
the simultaneous effect of geographic and industrial diversification on firm value.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the value
implications of  corporate diversification.  Section 3 discusses the data  and  valuation
2methodology used  to test simultaneously for  the value impact of both  industrial and
geographic diversification.  Section 4 presents the  empirical results  on the valuation
effects of  geographic  and  industrial diversification. Section  5 presents the  empirical
results on the investment effects of geographic and industrial diversification. Section 6
concludes.
2. Review of the Literature
Economic  theory  suggests  both  positive  and  negative  impacts  of  corporate
diversification on  firm value. Potential costs  associated with  corporate diversification
stem  from  the  increased  organizational complexity and  include  influence costs  and
agency costs.' The more complex the corporation, the more difficult it is for shareholders
to monitor management's  decision and the more difficult it is for an organization to set
the right incentives internally. Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) show that managers
of divisions that have a bleak future have an incentive to attempt to influence the top
management of  the  firm to  channel resources  in  their  direction. The organizational
complexity could also result in agency costs with managers deriving private benefits from
diversification that exceed their private costs. Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), and Denis et
al. (1997) argue that managers diversify to  increase firm size and to benefit from the
power and prestige of managing a larger firm. Diversification may also benefit managers
because managerial compensation is related to  firm size, as suggested by Jensen and
Murphy  (1990).  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1989)  demonstrate  that  managers  can  use
diversification to  entrench themselves and extract rents  from shareholders by making
manager-specific  investments.  Amihud  and  Lev (1981)  suggest that  managers  may
diversify to reduce the risk of their undiversifiable human capital. The organizational
complexity may also increase the internal agency conflicts and lead to power struggles
between divisions, as suggested by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000).
Potential benefits associated with corporate diversification include the improved
ability  to  take  advantage  of  the  tax  benefits  of  debt  financing  (Lewellen,  1971),
' The conjecture  that corporate  diversification  may destroy  firn value  was  first  put forward  by
Schmalensee  (1985).
3economies of scope (Teece, 1980), and the creation of an internal capital market (Stulz,
1990, Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), and Stein, 1997). However, internal capital
markets do not  always work efficiently. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) show how rent-
seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal
capital market.
The above costs and benefits of corporate diversification relate to both product
and  geographic  diversification. In  addition to  the  above theories,  economic theory
suggests a number of benefits of corporate diversification that are specific to geographic
diversification (Morck and Yeung, 1991). First, geographic diversification  may raise firm
value because it  provides  access to  relatively low-cost inputs from  abroad. Second,
geographic  diversification may  raise  firm  value  because  it  allows  the  firm  more
possibilities for tax avoidance.
Numerous studies have documented the stylized fact that product diversification
destroys firm value. Such studies include Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988), Lang and
Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Servaes (1996).
The effect of geographic diversification on firm value found in the literature has
been  more  ambiguous. Errunza  and  Senbet (1981,  1984) examine an  excess-value
measure for a sample of multinational firms and find that the value measure is increasing
with the degree of international activity. Morck and Yeung (1991) find that the positive
impact of research and development and advertising spending on a firm's  q is enhanced
by multinationality, but that multinationality itself has no significant impact on excess
firm value. Click and Harrison (2000) find for a sample of US  firms that corporate
multinationality destroys value. Bodnar et al. (1997) examine the simultaneous effect of
geographic and industrial diversification on firn  value for a sample of US corporations.
They find that geographic diversification enhances firm value by around 2% and that
product diversification destroys firm value by around 5%.
Related empirical work has asked specifically whether diversified firms allocate
their capital expenditures efficiently across divisions. The general answer has been no
and has been supported by two strands of evidence. First, studies such as Lamont (1997),
Shin and Stulz (1998), and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) all find that internal
capital markets in conglomerates transfer funds across divisions in a sub-optimal manner.
4Second, studies such as Berger and Ofek (1995), and Scharfstein (1997) provide evidence
suggesting that the divisions of conglomerates do not respond adequately to investment
opportunities, in comparison to single-segment firms. On the other hand, there also exist
empirical results in favor of the efficient internal market hypothesis, such as those in
Khanna and  Tice  (2001), although their results may be  specific to  the US  discount
department store industry, the industry of their attention.
Recent work suggests that the degree of corporate diversification depends on the
structure of  corporate ownership. Denis et al.  (1997) find  that the  level of  product
diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity
ownership of outside blockholders, and Click and Harrison (2000) find that the level of
geographic diversification is negatively related to insider ownership. The literature is,
however, not conclusive about the effect of insider ownership on the value of corporate
diversification.  Denis  et  al.  (1997)  find  little  evidence  that  the  value  loss  from
diversification is related to either managerial or outside blockholder ownership. Anderson
et al. (2000) also find that differences in the degree of managerial ownership do not
explain differences in the magnitude of the diversification discount. On the other hand,
Scharfstein (1997) finds that capital misallocation is more pronounced in conglomerates
where management has small ownership stakes, suggesting that insider ownership creates
firm value.
The  diversification  discount seems  to  be  country-specific. Lins  and  Servaes
(1999) examine the valuation effect of corporate diversification for firms in Germany,
Japan and  the  United Kingdom. They find no  significant diversification discount in
Germany, but a significant diversification discount in Japan and the UK, consistent with
the findings of related work for the US. Concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders
enhances the valuation effect of diversification in Germany, but not in Japan or the UK.
These findings suggest that international differences in corporate governance affect the
impact of diversification on shareholder wealth. Claessens et al. (1999b) show that firms
across countries also differ in whether they diversify vertically or horizontally. In general,
they find that vertical diversification destroys value and complementary diversification
enhances value.
5Institutional factors can explain differences across countries in the diversification
discount. Fauver  et al.  (1998) show that  in countries with poorly developed capital
markets, the conglomerate discount is not very large. Lins and Servaes (2000) find for a
sample of  East  Asian countries that  diversified finns  trade  at  a  larger discount in
countries with poorly-developed external capital markets, suggesting inefficient internal
capital markets in economies with imperfect external capital markets. Claessens et al.
(1999a) find that the role of internal capital markets and its relationship to the value of
diversification depends on the turbulence in the external capital market.
Some recent papers have raised some critical points with respect to the empirical
literature on the value of corporate diversification.  First, if investment  opportunities differ
between firms in the same industry, firms may endogenously choose to  diversify, in
which case exogenous variation in diversification is necessary in order to draw inferences
about the causal  effect  of corporate diversification on  firm value (Maksimovic and
Phillips, 2001). Lamont and Polk (2001a) find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to
changes in industry investment, are negatively related to firm value, consistent with the
diversification discount.  Second, Lamont and  Polk  (2001b) show that  a  substantial
fraction of the cross-sectional variance of diversification discounts is due to variation in
expected returns rather than variation in expected cash flows.
3. Description of the Data and Valuation Methodology
We  collect  firm  data  from  the  Worldscope database.  Worldscope provides
financial and ownership data for a large number of companies from 47 countries. Table 1
lists the number of companies at the start of the sample selection procedure and the
number of firms that drop out after applying several selection criteria to the data. We start
with the entire universe of firms on Worldscope. Since we need market values for the
companies  in  our  study, we  exclude private  companies from the analysis. We  also
exclude all corporations whose main line of business is in the financial services industry
(SIC 6000-6999). Financial firms are eliminated because our main valuation measure, the
market-to-assets ratio, is not meaningful for financial firms. Next, we focus on the year
1999 because diversification measures and ownership data are available only for the last
6accounting year, i.e., 1999 at the time of data collection. Because of possible business
cycle patterns over the year we only focus on the second part of the year. More precisely,
we exclude firms that do not report fiscal year-end data during the period July 1, 1999
until Jan 31, 2000. To avoid distorted valuation multiples for firms with sales or assets
near zero, we require firms to have sales and assets of at least $20 million. As measure of
geographic diversification we use the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. We therefore
eliminate companies that lack foreign sales data. We further eliminate a small number of
firms by restricting the ratio of foreign sales to total sales to take values not to exceed
100%. Finally, we delete all firms in countries with less than 20 firm observations. We
need  a  reasonable number of  observations for  each country to  correct  for possible
country-specific effects. These procedures result in a sample of  1,914 firms across 18
countries. Table 2 presents the distribution of firm observations across countries. Two-
thirds of the observations are from countries other than the UK or the US, but for some
countries we only have a small number of firms.
We measure geographic diversification by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
We classify firms as multinationals if the ratio of foreign sales to total sales exceeds 10%.
Industrial diversification is measured by the number of product segments2  in which a firm
operates where a product segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry. We define
industrially diversified firms as firms that operate in two or more two-digit SIC code
industries. Combining our measures of geographic and industrial diversification we can
distinguish  four  groups  of  firm:  single-segment  domestic  firms,  single-segment
multinational firms, industrially-diversified domestic firms and industrially-diversified
multinational firms. We also collect data on insider ownership of firms. We classify an
ownership position as insider ownership whenever the ownership position overlaps with
the list of officers and directors provided by Worldscope. The ownership positions are as
2 Lang  and Stulz  (1994)  note  that  the number  of different  main  SIC codes  reported  by the firm  as a measure
of product  diversification  turns  out to be extremely  similar  to the number  of product  segments  reported  by
the firni This  is true  for our sample  as well.  Lang  and Stulz  (1994)  also  show  that  the number  of segments
as a measure  of product  diversification  produces  similar  results  as two  other  diversification  measures  used
by Comment  and Jarrell  (1993),  namely,  the Herfindahl  index  computed  from  the sales of a firm  by
segment,  and the Herfindahl  index computed  from  the assets  of a firm  by segment.  This  suggests  that our
measure  of product  diversification,  the nurnber  of different  main  SIC  codes,  is as good  a proxy  for product
diversification  as any  of the other  measures  suggested  by Comment  and Jarrell  (1993).
7of end  1999. We classify insider firns  as firms with more than 5% of shares held by
insiders.
To  investigate  whether  diversified firms  are  valued  differently from  single-
segment firms, we employ a simplified version of the valuation methodology proposed
by Berger and Ofek (1995). They develop a method based on the ratio of total firm value
to total assets. Each segment of a diversified firm is assigned the valuation ratio of the
median of the single-segment firms that operate in the same industry. The imputed values
of all the segments of a company are then summed to compute the imputed value of that
company. The natural  logarithm of the ratio of the actual to imputed market value is
called the excess value of the firms, and it is used to determine whether diversified firms
are trading  at  a  discount or  a  premium. Berger and  Ofek  (1995) do  not  consider
geographic diversification but in theory it would be easy to  employ their methodology
both across product segrnents and geographic area segments. However, segment data is
only available either along product line or geographic area, but not across the matrix of
both products and geographic areas. In other words, data on sales in different geographic
areas is not available for each product group but only for the total sales of a firm, neither
is the product segrnent data available for each geographic area. The approach we follow
is similar in spirit though. We measure the excess value as the natural logarithm ratio of
the actual Tobin's  q to the imputed Tobin's q of the primary industrial segmnent  of the
firm on a  2-digit  SIC level, where the imputed Tobin's  q  of the primary industrial
segrnent is calculated as the Tobin's q of the median single activity firm with zero foreign
sales in that particular 2-digit SIC level industry.
Consistent with  the evidence in Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) that it is
diversity  in  investment  opportunities  between  segments within  firns  that  leads to
distorted investment allocations and hence value differences between diversified firms,
we use excess values on a two-digit SIC level rather than on a 4-digit SIC level, assuming
that diversity among four-digit SIC level industries within the same two-digit SIC level
8industry is low. 3 Also, we do not have enough firm observations to analyze firn  excess
values on a four-digit SIC level with enough statistical precision.
Due to data limitations we do not calculate the excess value based on imputed
value of single-segment finns in a particular industry for each country, but we average
across countries. We thus assume that excess value differs across industry and country
but that the country effect on excess value does not differ across industries. We include
country dummies to control for cross-country differences in excess values. Our approach
is similar to the one followed by La Porta et al. (2001) who measure industry-adjusted
Tobin's  q as the difference between Tobin's q and the world median Tobin's  q for the
firm's  industry; hence, they too make the industry adjustment relative to the world-wide
rather than country-wide average for a particular industry.
We construct our measure of excess firm value on the basis of the firm's primary
product segrnent. In principle, one would want to construct excess value using data on
each product  and  geographic segment. It  is,  however, difficult to  construct  a more
detailed measure of excess value given the availability of the data. As mentioned before,
segment data are unavailable along both product and geographic area and the segment
data in Worldscope are quite sparse. Product segment data are not available for many
companies  and do  not  always match  the  SIC industry codes. Moreover, geographic
segrnent data do not follow the same definition across firms. For some firms this type of
information is quite detailed with  a breakdown by country; for other firms geographic
segment data only distinguish between continents.
Table  III  contains descriptive statistics of the  firms in  our sample. We have
collected data on 1,914 firms from 18 countries. Most firms in the sample are diversified
either along products or geographic segments. Half of the firms is diversified along both
forms. Only 12% of the firms in the sample lack both multinational and product diversity.
Insider ownership is present in 17% of the firms, but varies from 13% in industrially-
diversified, multinational firms to 26% in single-segment, domestic fimns, suggesting that
insider firms are less diversified. We also find that the degree of diversification along
3 Indirectly,  we  thus distinguish  between  related  and unrelated  product  diversification,  acknowledging  that
unrelated  diversification  to the firm's core business  may  be valued  differently  than  related  diversification
(related  diversification  being diversification  within  the same  two-digit  industry  as the firm's core  business).
9either product or geographic segments is similar for firms that decide to diversify along
both  forms and  for  firms that diversify along one form of  diversification only. The
median  multinational  firtn has  a  ratio of  foreign sales  to  total  sales  of  50%, both
multinationals that do not diversify along product segments and multinationals that do.
Similarly, the  median  industrially-diversified firm is  diversified along three product
segrnents, independent of  whether it  is  also  diversified geographically or  not.  This
suggests that product  diversification and geographic diversification are uncorrelated.
Furthermore, we find that the multinational firms in our sample tend to be larger firms,
both in terms of assets and market capitalization. Our measure of firm value, Tobin's q,
indicates  that  single-segment, multinational  firms  tend  to  be  most  valuable, while
industrially-diversified, domestic firms to be the least valuable. This is confirmed by our
measure of excess firm value. Other things equal, multinational diversity increases excess
firm value and product diversity destroys excess firm value. For comparison purposes, we
also present median P/E ratios for the four different groups. Although P/E ratio may
suffer from a number of measurement problems, they show a similar pattern. Geographic
diversification increases value, while product diversification destroys value. Also, we
find that undiversified firms tend to be more leveraged,  more profitable (as measured by
cash  flow),  and  invest  more.  However,  our  industry-adjusted measure  of  excess
investment indicates that the more diversified firms tend to invest more. Our measure of
excess investment is consistent with our definition of excess value and is defined as the
natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's  actual capital expenditures-to-assets ratio to its
imputed capital expenditures-to-assets ratio. The imputed capital expenditures-to-assets
ratio is the capital expenditures-to-assets value of the median single activity firm with no
foreign sales that operates in the same primary industrial segment as measured on a 2-
digit level and has more than $20 million in assets and sales. Overall, we find that firms
with large industrial diversity tend to invest more and be valued less, while firms with
multinational diversity tend to invest more and be  valued more, suggesting that large
industrial diversity tends  to distort incentives and lead to  an inefficient allocation of
resources. These findings do however not control for firm-specifics and should therefore
be interpreted with caution. In the next section, we emrrploy  a regression analysis to isolate
the effect of firm diversity on firm value.
10In Tables 4-6, we present the correlations between some of the key variables of
our analysis. Again, we find that industrially-diversified  firms tend to be valued less, both
if we use the number of product segments or a dummy variable that takes value one if the
number  of  product  segments  equals  or  exceeds  two  as  a  measure  of  product
diversification. We also find that our measures of product diversification and geographic
diversification  are  not  highly  correlated,  although  the  correlation  is  positive  and
significantly different from zero, consistent with the remarks made earlier. Finally, we
find that insider ownership tends to be lower in diversified firms. Put differently, firms
where insiders own shares tend to diversify less, both  along products and geographic
areas.
4. Valuation Results
In this section we estimate the effects of product and geographic diversity on firm
value when controlling for a number of firm-specifics. In addition to making industry
adjustInents and to adding country dummies, it is important to control for a number of
other factors related to a firm's market-to-assets  ratio (see Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger
and Ofek (1995), among others). Other potential determinants of the market-to-assets
ratio are firm size, profitability,  growth opportunities and ownership. We control for
several of these characteristics in a regression framework that closely follows Lins and
Servaes (1999). In particular, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression model:
Excess value = a + b, (Industrial diversification measure)
+ b2 (Geographic diversification measure)
+ b3 (Log assets) + b4 (Cash flow/Sales)  (1)
+ b5 (Capital expenditures/Sales)
+ b6 (Insider ownership) + e.
Excess value has been defined previously as the natural logarithm ratio of the
actual Tobin's q to the imputed Tobin's q of the primary industrial segment of the firm on
a  2-digit  SIC  level.  The  ratio  of  cash  flow  to  sales  is  employed  as  a  proxy  for
11profitability,  and  the  ratio  of  capital  expenditures to  sales  as  a  proxy  for  growth
opportunities. We are particularly interested in the value and sign of the coefficients b,
and b2.
Table 7 reports the results of estimating the regression model in (1). We estimate
the model both  with only one  of the two diversification measures and with  the two
measures  simultaneously to  assess the  sensitivity of  the results.  We  find that  both
industrial  and  geographical  diversification  reduce  firm  value.  Given  that  we  low
correlation between our measures of industrial and geographical diversification reported
earlier, it is no surprise to also find that adding both measures of diversification to the
regression model simultaneously does not affect their individual coefficients compared to
estimation with one diversification measure only. We also find that larger firms (in terms
of assets) tend to be valued more.
We also consider whether any of the value impacts of diversification from Table 7
differ conditionally on the  form of  diversification. In particular, we are interested in
whether geographic diversification has a differential impact depending on whether the
firm  is  industrially diversified  or  not  and  whether industrial  diversification  has  a
differential impact depending on whether the firm is geographically diversified or not. A
similar type of test has been employed by Bodnar et al. (1997).
Table  8 presents  the results  of estimating the value  impact of  diversification
conditional upon the type of firm. We distinguish between single-activity firms versus
multi-activity  firrns, and  between  domestic  and  multinational  firms.  The  first  two
columns  of  Table  8  contain  the  results  for  the  tests  of  the  value  of  geographic
diversification  conditional on industrial diversification. When comparing the results of
regressions one  and  two  we  find  that  the regression coefficients of  the  geographic
diversification measures are significantly different between the two regressions. While
geographic diversification is found to destroy value for multi-activity firms, its effect on
value for single-activity firms is found to be not significantly different from zero. This
suggests that the value impact of geographic diversification is dependent on the extent of
industrial diversification. We also find that the industrial diversification intensity estimate
for the multi-activity firms only regression is negative and significant, suggesting that
12conditional on being multi-activity, industrial diversification has a negative impact on
firm value.
Columns three and four of Table 8 contain the results for the tests of the value of
industrial diversification conditional on geographic diversification. In the regression in
column three,  the regression  coefficient of  the  industrial  diversification measure is
negative and significantly different from zero. The estimate is not very different from the
regression coefficient of the industrial diversification measure in column four, which is
also negative and significantly different from zero. This suggests that the value impact of
geographic  diversification  is  relatively  constant  and  independent  of  the  extent  of
geographic  diversification.  We  also  find  that  the  geographic  diversification  impact
estimate for the  multinational firms only  regression in  column four  is negative and
significantly different from zero, suggesting that conditional on being a multinational, the
extent of geographic diversification reduces firm value.
Next,  we  investigate  whether  insider  ownership  affects  the  costs  of
diversification. This analysis is similar in spirit to that of Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997)
and Lins and Servaes (1999). Both studies find that diversified firms have lower insider
ownership, and that there is a weak link between insider ownership and firm value. Denis
et al. (1997) focus on US firms and find a weak link between insider ownership and the
diversification discount. Lins and Servaes (1999) find that concentrated ownership in the
hands of insiders enhances the valuation effect of diversification in Germany, but not in
Japan or the UK. To determine whether excess firm value is related to insider ownership,
we estimate a regression model similar to the one in (1), but we now include a dummy
variable that indicates whether the insiders (officers and directors) of the firm own more
than 5% of shares. The results are presented in column one of Table 9. We find that
insider ownership enhances the value of firm significantly.
Since  the  diversification  discounts  found  earlier could  be  related  to  insider
ownership as well, we also include two interaction terms between the insider ownership
dummy variable and our two measures of the two types of corporate diversification. This
setup follows Lins and Servaes (1999). The results of the regression that includes both
interaction terms are presented in column two of Table 9. We find that, when insiders
13control at least five percent of the company, the effects of both forms of diversification
on excess value increases, although not statistically significant.
Further investigation, however, suggests that the results in column 2 of Table 9
may suffer from a multicollinearity problem, because of the high correlation between the
additional explanatory variables. The correlation between the insider ownership variable
and the first interaction term ("industrial diversification times insider ownership") is 0.87
and the correlation between the insider ownership variable and the second interaction
term ("geographic diversification times insider ownership") is 0.59, while the correlation
between the two interaction terms is 0.55.
Therefore, we re-estimate the model twice with only one of the two interaction
terms. The results are presented in columns three and four of Table 9. Indeed, we find
that the results in column 2 are spurious. We now find that the effects of both product and
geographic diversification on excess value increases significantly when insiders control at
least five percent of the company.
We should note that our results in  Table 9  may suffer from a  selection bias
because insider owned firms tend to  be less diversified and may therefore be higher
valued. From  the correlation matrix in  Table  6 presented earlier, we  know that the
correlation  between  the  insider  ownership  dummy variable  and  our  diversification
dummy variables are negative and significantly different from zero. 4
We also test whether the value impact of both forms of diversification depend on
the  extent  of  diversification.  First,  we  estimate  the  statistical  significance  of  the
incremental contribution to excess form value of product diversification. Following Lang
and Stulz (1994)  we do this by using dummy variables DO) that take value one if the
firm has j  product segments or more. We then regress q on a constant, certain control
variables, and DO), with j = 2,3,4,5. In this regression, the coefficient on DO) has the
interpretation of a marginal contribution to q of the j-th product segment. Column one in
Table 10 presents the results of this regression. We find that the marginal contribution to
q of each product segment is negative and increasing in the number of segments (from -
2.4% for two product segments to -18.4%  for five product segments), but significantly
4 The correlations  with  the insider  ownership  dunmmy  variable  are -0.05  and -0.12,  respectively,  for our
product  and geographic  diversification  dunmmy  variables.
14different from zero only for four and or more product segment dummy variables. This
suggests that product diversification destroys firm value, especially at high levels of
product diversity.
Second, we test whether the value impact of geographic diversification depends
on the extent of geographic diversification. The conflicting results in Tables 7 and 8
suggest that this may the case. To test this, we add to the model in (1) a dummy variable
that  indicates whether  the  firm is  a  multinational or  not.  Earlier, we  have defined
multinationals as firms that have foreign sales exceeding 10% of total sales. We find that
being  a  multinational has  a  positive impact on  firm value, but  that  high  levels of
geographic diversification reduce firm value. This suggest that geographic diversification
is value enhancing at low levels of multinational diversity, but has a negative impact on
firm  value  at  high  levels  of  multinational  diversity.  According  to  the  regression
coefficients, geographic diversification enhances value at levels of foreign sales that do
not  exceed 48% of total  sales. Apparently, geographic diversification that exceed this
critical  level suffers from  agency and influence costs arising from the organizational
complexity of a highly-diversified multinational conglomerate.
5. Investment Results
Berger  and  Ofek  (1995)  were  the  first  to  pin  the  underperformance  of
conglomerates on poor investment decisions. They showed that conglomerates that invest
more in divisions with poor investment opportunities tend to trade at bigger discounts to
their break-up value. They also found that conglomerates with larger discounts relative to
their stand- alone values were more likely to be busted up and to increase their focus.
Scharfstein (1997) looks at the investment behavior of 165 US conglomerates operating
in  unrelated  business.  Divisions  in  industries  with  relatively  poor  investment
opportunities tended to invest more than their stand-alone industry peers, while divisions
in industries with relatively good investment opportunities tended to invest less than their
industry  peers.  Capital  misallocation  is  more  pronounced in  conglomerates  where
management has  small ownership  stakes; in  contrast, where  headquarters has  strong
financial incentives, conglomerate divisions behave more like stand-alone finns. Thus,
15capital misallocation appears to be tied to agency problems at the headquarters level.
Finally, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1998) show that capital misallocation of this type
seems to be more pronounced in firms with very different investment  opportunities across
divisions.
In this  section we will investigate the allocative efficiency of capital and how
investment levels differ across firms with different levels of diversity. To this end, we
estimate the following regression model:
Excess investment = a + b 1 (Industrial  diversification measure)
+ b 2 (Geographic  diversification measure)
+ b3 (Log assets) + b 4 (Excess value)  (2)
+ b5 (Insider ownership) + e.
Excess investment has been defined previously as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a
firm's  actual capital expenditures-to-assets  ratio to its imputed capital expenditures-to-
assets ratio. We use investment and firm value variables in excess of their respective
imputed values to control for industry effects. We control for differences across countries
by adding country dummies. If capital is allocated efficiently, then there should be a one-
to-one relationship between changes in excess value and changes in excess investmnent;  in
other words, the coefficient b4 should equal one.
The regression results of estimating model (2) are presented in Table 11. We have
estimated model (2) both with  and without the insider ownership variable, and also
focusing on one type of diversification only. In general, we find that firm investment
responds positively to changes in excess firm value, although not as strongly as efficient
allocation would suggest. Furthermore, we find that firms that are more diversified, both
in terms of product and geographic diversity, tend to invest more. Insider ownership, on
the other hand, is not found to affect the level of investment across firms. These findings
are consistent with the valuation effects found in section 4. Highly diversified firms are
found to  make inefficient capital investmnents  and  are (consequently) valued less by
investors. Although insider ownership does not improve the allocation of capital, it does
improve firm value, because insider owned firns  tend to less diversified, suggesting that
16insiders with firm ownership tend to prevent the firm from reaching levels of diversity
that are value destroying.
In model (2) we do not include a cash flow variable for two reasons. Cash flow
measures are often added to investment models to measure financing constraints (see, for
example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)). First, a cash flow measure is likely to
be correlated with Tobin's q, resulting in measurement error (see Kaplan and Zingales,
1997) for problems with adding cash flow variables to measure financing constraints).
Second, our sample includes large firms with access to global capital markets that are
unlikely to be financially constrained. Any relationship found would most likely be a
result of measurement error. For robustness, however, we have estimated model (2) with
cash flow-to-sales as a measure of internal cash flow as well. The coefficient of this
variable is not significant and the results are not affected. These results are not presented
here.
Finally, we consider whether any of the impacts of diversification on investment
levels from Table  1I differ conditionally on the form of diversification. In particular, we
are interested in whether geographic diversification has a differential impact depending
on whether the firm is industrially diversified or not and whether industrial diversification
has a differential impact depending on whether the firm is geographically diversified or
not. We have applied a similar type of test on excess values in section 4.
Table  12 presents  the  results  of  estimating the impact of  diversification on
investment conditional upon the type of firm. As in section 4, we distinguish between
single-activity firms versus multi-activity firms, and between domestic and multinational
firms. The first two columns of Table 12 contain the results for the tests of the impact of
geographic diversification on investment conditional on industrial diversification. When
comparing the results of regressions one and two we find that the regression coefficients
of the geographic diversification measures are significantly different between the two
regressions. While geographic diversification is found to tend to go together with high
levels  of firm investment value for multi-activity finns, its  effect on investment for
single-activity firrns is found to be not significantly different from zero. This suggests
that the impact of geographic diversification on investment is dependent on the extent of
industrial diversification. We also find that the industrial diversification intensity estimate
17for the  multi-activity  firmns  only  regression is  not  significantly different from  zero,
suggesting that  conditional on  being multi-activity, industrial diversification has  no
impact on the level of firm investment.
Columns three and four of Table 12 contain the results for the tests of the impact
of industrial diversification on firm investment conditional on geographic diversification.
In  the  regression  in  column  three,  the  regression  coefficient  of  the  industrial
diversification measure is not significantly different from zero. The estimate is different
from the regression coefficient of the industrial diversification measure in column four,
which is positive and significantly different from zero. This suggests that the impact of
geographic diversification on firm investment is dependent on the extent of geographic
diversification. We also find that the geographic diversification impact estimate for the
multinational firms only regression in  column four is not significantly different from
zero, suggesting that  conditional on being a  multinational, the extent  of geographic
diversification does not affect the level of firm investment. In sum, the results in Table 12
indicate that highly diversified firms invest more than firms that specialize either in one
activity or in one market.
6. Conclusions
We find that geographic diversification is value enhancing only up to a certain
level but that in general both product and geographic diversification are value destroying.
These findings are consistent with the following theories. A low degree of geographic
diversification raises firm value because it provides access to relatively low-cost inputs
from abroad and because it allows the firm more possibilities for tax avoidance. Beyond a
certain level, however, geographic diversification leads to too complex organizations and
becomes  value  destroying.  Product  diversification  as  well  leads  to  more  complex
organizations and to more internal incentive problems and is value destroying in general.
We  also  find  that  insider-owned firms  tend  to  be  less diversified  and  that  insider
ownership of firms enhances firm value, suggesting that insiders with firm ownership
tend to prevent the firm from reaching levels of diversity that are value destroying. This
finding may also suggest that the incentive problems in diversified firms are smaller with
18self-interested owner-managers. Owner-managers may strongly influence the decision-
making process internally which could reduce the incentive problems in the organization
of the corporation. Consistent with the low valuation of highly diversified firms, we also
find that highly diversified firms make inefficient capital investments.
Many of our findings are consistent with previous results found in the literature.
The product diversification discount found is consistent with the results in Lang and Stulz
(1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) and of similar order of magnitude. The non-linear
relationship between geographic diversity and corporate value is  consistent with  the
conflicting findings by Errunza and  Senbet (1981,  1984), Morck and  Yeung (1991),
Bodnar et al. (1997) and Click and Harrison (2000). The cost of diversification beyond
the primary  2-digit SIC code product segment is also consistent with the findings in
Claessens  et  al. (1999b)  that  vertical diversification is  found to  destroy  value  and
complementary diversification is found to enhance value, since vertical diversification
tends to be outside the primary product segment and complementary  diversification tends
to  be within the primary product segment. Furthernore,  the cost of diversity can be
explained by the models in Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992), Scharfstein and Stein
(2000), or Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000). Our finding that insider ownership is
related  to  less  corporate  diversification  and  may  therefore  enhance  value  differs
somewhat from previous results found in the literature. For instance, although Lins and
Servaes (1999) also find that concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders enhances
the valuation effect of  diversification in the case of Germany, they do not  find any
significant relationship between the value of diversification and insider ownership in the
US and the UK, consistent with the work by Denis et al., (1997) and Anderson et al.
(2000). Our findings suggest that the impact of the structure of corporate ownership on
the value of corporate diversification is country-specific and suggests that concentrated
ownership in  the hands of insiders may be valuable in countries with poor corporate
governance.
Our findings suggest that many diversified firns  around the world have reached
levels of diversity that are value-destroying. These firms should focus and limit the scope
of their activities to a smaller number of product and geographic segments. For example,
conglomerate mergers should tend to be complementary rather than vertical and many
19multinationals may consider focusing on a number of core markets and divest activities in
markets where the firm does not have comparative advantage.
20References
Amihud, Yakov and Baruch Lev (1981), "Risk Reduction as a Motive for Conglomerate
Mergers", Bell Journal of Economics 12(2), 605-617.
Anderson, Ronald C., Thomas W. Bates, John M. Bizjak, and Michael L. Lemmon (Apr.
2000), "Corporate Governance and Firm Diversification", Financial Management
29(1), 5-22.
Berger, Philip G., and Eli Ofek (1995), "Diversification's Effect on Firm Value", Journal
of Financial Economics 37(1), 39-65.
Berger, Philip G., and Eli Ofek (1999), "Causes and Effects of Corporate Refocusing
Programs", Review of Financial Studies 12(2), 311-345.
Bodnar,  Gordon  M.,  Charles  Tang,  Joseph  Weintrop  (Oct.  1997), "Both  Sides  of
Corporate  Diversification:  The  Value  Impacts  of  Geographic and  Industrial
Diversification", Working Paper 6224, NBER.
Bolton, Patrick and David S. Scharfstein (Fall 1998), "Corporate Finance, the Theory of
the Firm, and Organizations", Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4), 95-114.
Chevalier, Judith  (Jul.  1999), "Why Do Firms Undertake Diversifying Mergers? An
Examination  of  the  Investment Policies  of  Merging  Firms",  working paper,
University of Chicago.
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan, and Larry H.P. Lang (1999a), "The
Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets: Evidence from Asia's  Financial Crisis",
Mimeo, World Bank, Sep. 1999.
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan, and Larry H.P. Lang (1999b), "The
Pattern and Valuation Effects of Corporate Diversification: A Comparison of the
United States, Japan, and Other East Asian Economies", Mimeo, World Bank,
Jul. 1999.
Click, Reid W., and Paul Harrison (Feb. 2000), "Does Multinationality Matter? Evidence
of Value Destruction in U.S. Multinational Corporations", Working Paper 2000-
21, FEDS.
Comment, Robert, and Gregg A. Jarrell (1995), "Corporate Focus and Stock Returns",
Journal of Financial Economics 37(1), 67-87.
Denis, David J., Diane K. Denis, and Atulya Sarin (1997), "Agency Problems, Equity
Ownership, and Corporate Diversification", Journal of Finance 52(1),  135-160.
21Errunza, Vihang R., and Lemma W. Senbet (May 1981), "The Effects of International
Operations on the Market Value of the Firm: Theory and Evidence", Journal of
Finance 36, 401-417.
Ermnza,  Vihang  R.,  Lemma  W.  Senbet  (July  1984),  "International  Corporate
Diversification, Market  Valuation,  and  Size-Adjusted Evidence",  Journal  of
Finance 39, 727-45.
Fauver, Larry, Joel Houston, and Andy Naranjo (1998), "Capital Market Development,
Legal  Systems and  the Value of  Corporate Diversification: A  Cross  Country
Analysis", Mimeo, University of Florida.
Fazzari,  Steven  M.,  R.  Glenn  Hubbard  and  Bruce  C.  Petersen  (1988),  "Financing
Constraints and Corporate Investment",  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
1, 141-195.
Gertner, Robert H., David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. Stein (Nov. 1994), "Internal
Versus External Capital Markets", Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4), 1211-
1230.
Graham, John R., Michael L. Lemmon, and Jack G. Wolf (Forthcoming 2002), "Does
Corporate Diversification Destroy Value?", Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
Jensen, Michael C. (1986), "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and
Takeovers", American Economic Review 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen,  Michael  C.  And  Kevin  J.  Murphy  (1990),  "Performance  Pay  and  Top
Management Incentives", Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264.
John, Kose and Eli Ofek (Jan. 1995), "Asset Sales and Increase in Focus", Journal of
Financial Economics 37(1), 105-126.
Kaplan,  Steven  N.  and  Luigi  Zingales  (Feb.  1997),  "Do  Investment-Cash  Flow
Sensitivities Provide  Useful Measures  of  Financing  Constraints?",  Quarterly
Journal ofEconomics  112(1), 169-215.
Khanna, Naveen,  and Sheri  Tice  (Aug. 2001), "The  Bright Side  of Internal  Capital
Markets", Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
La  Porta,  Rafael,  Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei  Shleifer,  and  Robert  Vishny
(Forthcoming 2001), "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation", Journal of
Finance, Forthcoming.
Lamont, Owen A. (1997), "Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital
Markets", Journal of Finance 52, 83-109.
22Lamont, Owen A. and Christopher Polk (2001  a), "Does Diversification Destroy Value?
Evidence from Industry Shocks", Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
Lamont, Owen A. and Christopher Polk (Oct. 2001b), "The Diversification Discount:
Cash Flows Versus Returns", Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
Lang, Larry H. P., Annette  Poulsen, and Rene M. Stulz (1995), "Asset  Sales, Firm
Performance,  and  the  Agency  Costs of  Managerial  Discretion", Journal  of
Financial Economics 37, 3-37.
Lang, Larry H. P., and Rene M. Stulz (1994), "Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification and
Firm Performance", Journal of Political Economy 102(6), 1248-1280.
Lewellen, Wilbur G. (1971), "A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger",
Journal of Finance 26(2), 521-537.
Lins, Karl,  and Henri  Servaes (Dec.  1999), "International Evidence on the Value of
Corporate Diversification", Journal of Finance 54(6), 2215-2239.
Lins, Karl, and Henri Servaes (Mar. 2000), "Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in
Emerging Markets?", Mimeo, London Business School.
Maksimovic, Vojislav, and  Gordon Phillips (Forthcoming 2001),  "Do  Conglomerate
Firms Allocate Resources Inefficiently?",  Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
Matsusaka, John G. (Jul. 2001), "Corporate Diversification, Value Maximization, and
Organizational Capabilities", Journal of Business 74(3), Forthcoming.
Meyer,  M., P. Milgrom, and  J. Roberts (1992), "Organizational Prospects, Influence
Costs,  and  Ownership  Changes",  Journal  of  Economics  and  Management
Strategy 1, 9-35.
Morck, Randall, Andrei  Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1990), "Do  Managerial Motives
Drive Bad Acquisitions?", Journal of Finance 45, 31-48.
Morek,  Randall,  and  Bernard  Yeung  (Apr.  1991),  "Why  Investors  Value
Multinationality", Journal of Business 64 (2), 165-187.
Rajan,  Raghuram,  Henri  Servaes,  and  Luigi  Zingales  (Feb.  2000),  "The  Cost  of
Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment", Journal of
Finance 55(1), 35-80.
Scharfstein, David  S.  (Jan.  1998), "The  Dark  Side  of Internal  Capital Markets  II:
Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates", Working Paper 6352, NBER.
23Scharfstein, David  S., and Jeremy C. Stein (Dec.  2000), "The Dark Side of Internal
Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment", Journal of
Finance 55(6), 2537-2564.
Schmalensee, Richard (Jun. 1985), "Do  Markets Differ Much?", American Economic
Review 75, 341-351.
Schlingemann, Frederik P., Rene M. Stulz, Ralph A. Walkling (2000), "Divestitures and
the Liquidity of the Market for Corporate Assets", Working paper 2000-12, Dice
Center, Ohio State University.
Servaes, Henri (1996), "The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger
Wave", Journal of Finance 51(4), 1201-1225.
Shin,  Hyun-Han,  and  Rene  M.  Stulz  (May  1998),  "Are  Internal  Capital  Markets
Efficient?", Quarterly Journal of Economics 133(2), 531-552.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny (1989), "Management Entrenchment: The Case of
Manager-Specific Investment", Journal of Financial Economics 25(1), 123-140.
Stein, Jeremy C. (1997), "Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate
Resources", Journal of Finance 52(1), 111-134.
Stulz, Rene  M.  (1990), "Managerial Discretion and  Financing Policies", Journal  of
Financial Economics 26(1), 3-28.
Teece, David J. (1980), "Economies and Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise", Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 1, 223-247.
Wemerfelt,  Birger  and  Cynthia  A.  Montgomery (Mar.  1988), "Tobin's  q  and  the
Importance of Focus in Firm Performance", American Economic Review 78(1),
246-250.
Whited, Toni M. (Oct. 2001), "Is It Inefficient Investment that Causes the Diversification
Discount?", Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
24Table I
Sample Selection Procedure
Data are gathered from the Worldscope database. Excluded from the sample are: firms not listed on a stock
exchange, firms in the financial services industry, firms without financial data for the year 1999, firnr with
reporting date in the first half of the year, finms that do not report foreign sales, finns that report foreign
sales that exceed total sales, and firms in countries with less han 20 remaining firms.
Number of firms
Number of firms on Worldscope  15,285
Substract: Unlisted firms  (2,176)
Substract: Firms in the financial services industry (PSIC between  (2,433)
6000 and 6999)
Substract: Firms without financial data for 1999  (3,470)
Substract: Firms that report financials during first half of the year  (3,218)
Substract: Firms with assets or sales less than US$20mln  (900)
Substract: Firms for which data on foreign sales is missing  (947)
Substract: Firms with foreign sales to total sales larger than 100%  (5)
Firms remaining for all countries  2,136
Substract: Countries with less than 20 firm observations  (222)
Final sample  1,914
25Table II
Sample Distribution Across Countries
Country  Number of firms  Percentage
Australia  118  6.2
Canada  211  11.0
Denmark  46  2.4
Finland  47  2.5
France  156  8.2
Germany  105  5.5
Hong Kong  57  3.0
Japan  60  3.1
Malaysia  89  4.7
Netherlands  62  3.2
Norway  20  1.0
Singapore  44  2.3
South Africa  30  1.6
Sweden  69  3.6
Switzerland  36  1.9
Thailand  50  2.6
United Kingdom  384  20.1
United States  330  17.2
Total  1,914  100.0
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Sample Distribution and Descriptive Statistics
Industrially-diversified multinational firms are  firms that  operate  in two or  more two-digit SIC code
industries and have foreign sales of more than 10% of total sales. Industrially-diversified domestic firms
are firms that operate in two or more two-digit SIC code industries and have foreign sales of less than 10%
of total sales. Single-segment multinational firms are firms that operate in only one two-digit SIC code
industry but do have foreign sales of more than 10% of total sales. Single-segment domestic firms are firms
that operate in only one two-digit SIC code industry and have foreign sales of less than 10% of total sales.
Descriptive statistics are medians. Leverage ratio is defined as book value of debt divided by total assets.
Insider firms are finms  with more than 5% of shares held by insiders. We classify an ownership position as
insider ownership whenever the ownership position overlaps with the list of officers and directors provided
by Worldscope. The excess value measure is the natural logarithm ratio of  Tobin's  q  to the  imputed
Tobin's q value of the primary industrial segment of the firn  on a 2-digit SIC level. The imputed Tobin's q
value of  the primary industrial segment is the Tobin's  q of  the median domestic single activity firm
(domestic firm being defined as a firm with foreign sales less than 10% of total sales) in that particular 2-
digit SIC level industry with more than $20 million in assets and sales. By definition the median measure of
excess value and the excess capex/assets for the domestic single activity firns  will be zero.
Industrially-  Industrially-  Single-segment  Single-segment
diversified  diversified  multinational  domestic
multinational  domestic
Number of firms  958 (50%)  461 (24%)  271 (14%)  224 (12%)
(% of total firms)
Number of insider firms  125 (13%)  101 (22%)  43 (16%)  59 (26%)
(% of  number of  firns  in
category)
Number of segments  3  3  1  1
(2-digit SIC codes)
Foreign sales/Total sales  0.477  0  0.511  0
Total assets ($mln)  1095  292  815  254
Total market cap ($m1n)  811  193  830  278
Tobin's Q  1.37  1.16  1.65  1.33
Excess value  0.04  -0.04  0.10  0
P/E ratio  15.6  11.9  17.1  13.0
Leverage ratio  0.239  0.217  0.244  0.266
Cash flow/sales  0.096  0.094  0.110  0.119
Capital expenditures/sales  0.051  0.051  0.052  0.069
Excess capex/assets  0.283  0.172  0.070  0
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Correlation Matrix of Excess Value versus Diversification Measures
The excess  value measure  is the natural  logarithm  ratio of Tobin's  q to the imputed  Tobin's  q value  of the
primary  industrial  segment  of the firm  on a 2-digit  SIC level.  The measure  of product  diversification  is the
number  of product  segments  in which  a firm operates  where  a product  segment  is defined  as a two-digit
SCI  code  industry.  The measure  of geographic  diversification  is the ratio  of foreign  sales  to total  sales.
p-value  of test of significant  difference  from  zero  between  brackets
Nobs=1,769  Excess  value  Product  diversification  Geographic  diversification
Excess  value  1.0000
Product  diversification  -0.0642***  1.0000
(0.0069)
Geographic  diversification  -0.0377  0.0813***  1.0000
(0.1126)_________  } 9  3(0.0015)
Table V
Correlation Matrix of Excess Value versus Diversification  Dummies
The excess  value  measure  is the natural  logarithm  ratio of Tobin's  q to the imputed  Tobin's  q value  of the
primary  industrial  segment  of the firm  on a 2-digit SIC level. The product  diversification  dummy  takes
value one if the firm operates in two or more two-digit  SIC code industries,  and zero otherwise.  The
geographic  diversification  dummy  takes value one if the ratio of foreign  sales to total sales equals or
exceeds 10 percent, and zero otherwise.  p-value of test of significant  difference  from zero between
brackets.
Nobs=  1,769  Excess  value  Product  diversification  Geographic  diversification
l_____________  ldummy  durmny
Excess  value  1.0000
Product  diversification  -0.0439*  1.0000
dummy  _  (0.0649)___I_  I
Geographic  diversification  0.0289  0.1  166***  1.0000
dummy  (0.2238)  (0.0000)
Table VI
Correlation Matrix of Insider Ownership versus Diversification Dummies
Insider  ownership  dummy  is a dummy  variable  that takes  value  one if more  than 5% of the firm's shares
are held by insiders,  and zero otherwise.  The product  diversification  dummy  takes value  one if the firm
operates  in two or more  two-digit  SIC code industries,  and zero  otherwise.  The geographic  diversification
dummy  takes  value one if the ratio of foreign  sales to total  sales equals  or exceeds  10 percent,  and zero
otherwise.  p-value  of test of significant  difference  from  zero  between  brackets.
Nobs=1,914  Insider  ownership  Product  diversification  Geographic  diversification
dummy  dummy  dummy
Insider  ownership  1.0000
dummy  ____  _
Product  diversification  -0.0544**  1.0000
dumny  (0.0174)
Geographic  diversification  -0.1232***  0.1166***  1.0000
durnmy  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
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Regression Models of Excess Value on Measures of Industrial and Geographical
Diversification, and Control Variables for 1999
The  following  regression  model  is estimated  for  the sample  of all countries:
Excess  value  = a + b, (industrial  diversification  measure)  + b2(geographical  diversification  measure)
+ b3 (In  assets)  + b4(cash  flow-to-sales)  + b5 (capital  expenditures-to-sales)  + e.
Excess  value  is defined  as the natural  logarithm  of the ratio of a firm's actual  market-to  assets  ratio to its
imputed  market-to-assets  ratio. The inputed market-to-assets  ratio is the market-to-assets  value of the
median single  activity firm with  no foreign  sales that  operates  in the same  primary  industrial  segment  as
measured on a 2-digit SIC level and has more than $20 million in assets and sales. The industrial
diversification  measure  equals the number  of product  segments  in which  a firm operates  where  a product
segment  is defined  as a two-digit  SIC code industry.  The geographical  diversification  measure  equals  the
foreign  sales-to-sales  ratio of the firm.  We include  country  dummies  but these  are not  reported.  The  p-value
of the t-test of equality  of the coefficient  to zero is reported  in parentheses.  We use heteroskedasticity-
corrected  standard  errors.
Variable  L(2)  (3
Intercept  -0.675  -0.722  -0.722
(0.00)  _  090  (0.00)  p
Industrial  diversification  -0.036  - -0.036
(0.01)  (0.01)
Geographical  diversification  - -0.119  -0.118
I  (0.04)  (0.04)
Log  of total  assets  0.047  0048  0.053
(0.00)  (° °°)  (0.00)
Cash  flow-to-sales  0.113  0.118  0.109
(0.36)  (0.34)  (0.37)
Capital  expenditures-to-sales  0.034  0.035  0.021
§  l  ~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~  ~  ~~(0.53  (0.51)  (0.69)
Adjusted  R2  0.06  0.05  0.06
Number  of observations  1704  1704  1704
29Table  VIII
Regression  Models  of Conditional  Value  Impacts  of Diversification  for  1999
The following  regression  model  is estimated  for a subset  of the finms:
Excess  value  = a + b, (industrial  diversification  measure)  + b2(geographical  diversification  measure)
+ b3 (In  assets)  + b4 (cash  flow-to-sales)  + b5 (capital  expenditures-to-sales)  + e.
Excess  value  is defined  as the natural  logarithm  of the ratio of a firm's actual  market-to  assets  ratio to its
imputed  market-to-assets  ratio. The inputed market-to-assets  ratio is the market-to-assets  value of the
median single  activity firm  with no foreign  sales that operates  in the same  primary  industrial  segment  as
measured on a 2-digit SIC level and has more than $20 million in assets and sales. The industrial
diversification  measure  equals the number  of product  segments  in which  a firm  operates  where  a product
segment  is defined  as a two-digit  SIC code  industry.  The geographical  diversification  measure  equals  the
foreign  sales-to-sales  ratio of the firmL  We include  country  dummies  but  these  are not reported.  The  p-value
of the t-test of equality  of the coefficient  to zero is reported  in parentheses.  We use heteroskedasticity-
corrected  standard  errors.
Conditional  tests  of the  Value  imnact  of:
Geographical  diversification  Industrial  diversification
Variable  Single-Activity  Multi-activity  Domestic  Multinational
firms  only  firms  only  firms  only  firms  only
Intercept  -0.418  -0.784  -0.364  -0.799
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.00)
Industrial  diversification  - -0.039  -0.041  -0.043
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.02)
Geographical  diversification  -0.018  -0.156  - -0.259
(0.87)  (0.02)  (0.04)
Log of total  assets  0.025  0.058  0.023  0.065
(0.25)  (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.00)
Cash  flow-to-sales  -0.050  0.196  0.065  0.125
(0.75)  (0.33)  (0.67)  (0.45)
Capital  expenditures-to-sales  0.006  0.071  0.094  0.040
(0.95)  (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.54)
Adjusted  R2  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.08
Number  of observations  463  1240  592  1111
30Table IX
Regression  Models  of Excess Value  on Measures of Industrial  and Geographical
Diversification,  Insider  Ownership  and Control Variables  for 1999
The following regression model is estimated for the sample of all countries:
Excess value = a + b, (industrial diversification  measure) + b2 (geographical diversification measure)
+ b3 (In assets) + b 4 (cash flow-to-sales)  + b5 (capital expenditures-to-sales)
+ b6 (insider ownership) + e.
Excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual market-to assets ratio to its
imputed market-to-assets ratio.  The imputed market-to-assets ratio  is the  market-to-assets value of  the
median single activity firm with no foreign sales that operates in the same primary industrial segment as
measured on  a  2-digit  SIC level  and  has  more than $20  million in  assets  and  sales. The  industrial
diversification measure equals the number of product segments in which a firm operates where a product
segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry. The geographical diversification measure equals the
foreign sales-to-sales ratio of the firmn.  We add a dummy  variable called insider ownership that takes value
one  if 5%  or  more of total  shares are held by  insiders. The interaction terns  in columns (2)-(4) are
constructed in terms of the multiples of the diversification measures times the insider ownership dummy
variable. We classify an ownership position as insider ownership whenever the ownership position overlaps
with the list of officers and directors provided by Worldscope. We include country dummuies  but these are
not reported. The p-value of the t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses. We
use heteroskedasticity-corrected  standard errors.
Variable  (  _ _  (4
Intercept  -0.819  -0.813  -0.787  -0.770
(0.00)  (O  00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Industrial diversification  -0.034  -0.037  -0.041  -0.035
0  ______________________________  ___X  0  )(0.01)  (0 °02  (0.00)  (0.01)
Geographical diversification  -0.112  -0.124  -0.112  -0.152
_(05)  (  0  .05)  (0.05)  (0.01)
Log of total assets  0.059  0.060  0.058  0.057
_____(0.00)  _  _(0  .00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Cashflow-to-sales  0.114  0.111  0.111  0.105
(0.35)  (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.37)
Capital expenditures-to-sales  0.021  0.021  0.023  0.020
(0.68)  (0.68)  (0.67)  (0.70)
Insider ownership  0.120  0.055  -
(0.01)  (0.55)
Industrially diversified * insider ownership  - 0.020  0.047  -
(0.56_  (0.00)
Geographicaly  diversified * insider ownership  - 0.072  - 0.225
(0.62)  (0.06)
Adjusted R2  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06
Number of observations  1704  1704  1704  1704
31Table X
Regression Models of Excess Value on Measures of Industrial and Geographical
Diversification and Control Variables for 1999
The following regression models are estimated for the sample of all countries:
Excess value = a + b, (number of product segments dummies) + b2 (geographical diversification  measure)
+ b3 (In  assets) + b4 (cash flow-to-sales)  + b5 (capital expenditures-to-sales)  + e.
Excess value = a + b, (industrial diversification  measure) + b2 (geographical diversification measure)
+ b3 (multinational  dummy) + b4 (hn  assets) + b5 (cash flow-to-sales)
+ b5 (capital expenditures-to-sales)  + e.
Excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual market-to assets ratio to its
imputed market-to-assets ratio. The product segment dummies take value one if the number of product
segments in which a firm operates equals a certain number where a product segment is defined as a two-
digit SIC code industry. The industrial  diversification measure in column two equals the number of product
segments in which a firm operates where a product segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
The  geographical  diversification  measure  equals  the  foreign  sales-to-sales  ratio  of  the  firm.  The
multinational dummy takes value one if  foreign sales exceed 10% of total sales. We  include country
dummies but these are not reported. The p-value of the t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is
reported in parentheses. We use heteroskedasticity-corrected  standard errors.
Variable  (1)  (2)
Intercept  -0.763  -0.751
Industrial diversification  - -0.040
Two  product  seLments  dummy  -0.024  ________  _(0.00)
Two product segments dummy  -0.024
l  |  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(0.57)
Three  product  segmnents  dunumy  _  _  -0.067 
Four product segments dummy  -0.081
I  I  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(0.09)
Five or more product segments duemy  -0.184
(0.02)  _
Geographical diversification  -0.117  -0.255
(0.04)  (0.00)
Multinational dummy  _  0.123
_  _  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(0.02)
Log of total assets  0.052  0.053
7  _  1~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~0.00)  (0.00)
Cash flow-to-sales  0.111  0.114
(0.36)  (0.34)
Capital expenditures-to-sales  0.021  0.039
(0.69)  (0.46)
Adjusted R2  0.06  0.06
Number of observations  1704  1704
32Table XI
Regression Models of Excess Investment on Measures of Industrial and
Geographical Diversification, and Control Variables for 1999
The following regression model is estimated for the sample of all countries:
Excess investment = a + b, (industrial diversification  measure) + b2 (geographical diversification  measure)
+ b3 (In assets) + b4 (excess value) + e.
Excess investment is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual investment-to assets
ratio to its imnputed  investment-to-assets  ratio. The imputed investment-to-assets  ratio is the investment-to-
assets value of the median single activity firm with no foreign sales that operates in the same primary
industrial segment as measured on a 2-digit SIC level and has more than $20 million in assets and sales.
Investments are measured as capital expenditures. The industrial  diversification measure equals the number
of product segments in which a firm operates where a product segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code
industry.  The geographical diversification measure equals the  foreign sales-to-sales ratio  of  the  firm.
Excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual market-to assets ratio to its
imputed market-to-assets ratio. The imputed market-to-assets ratio  is the  market-to-assets value of the
median single activity firm with no foreign sales that operates in the same primary industrial segment as
measured on a 2-digit SIC level and has more than $20 million in assets and sales. We include country
dummies but these are not reported. The p-value of the  t-test of  equality of  the coefficient to zero is
reported in parentheses. We use heteroskedasticity-corrected  standard errors.
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) |(4
Intercept  -0.313  -0.176  -0.220  -0.220
______________________________ (0.25)  (0.52)  (0.42)  (0.42)
Industrial diversification  0.064  - 0.063  0.063
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)
Geographical diversification  - 0.228  0.225  0.225
____  ___________________  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)
Log of total assets (t-1)  0.009  0.006  -0.002  -0.002
(0.63)  (0.76)  (0.93)  (0.93)
Excess value (t-l)  0.227  0.225  0.232  0.232
((0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Insider ownership  _-  - -0.002
(0.983)
Adjusted R2  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08
Number of observations  1704  1704  1704  1704
33Table  XII
Regression  Models of Conditional  Investments  Impacts  of Diversification  for 1999
The following regression model is estimated for a subset of the firms:
Excess investment = a + b1 (industrial diversification  measure) + b2 (geographical  diversification measure)
+ b3 (In assets) + b4 (excess value) + e.
Excess investment is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual investment-to assets
ratio to its imputed investment-to-assets  ratio. The imnputed  investment-to-assets  ratio is the investment-to-
assets value of  the median single activity firm with no foreign sales that operates in the same primary
industrial segment as measured on a 2-digit SIC level and has more than $20 million in assets and sales.
Investments are measured as capital expenditures.  The industrial diversification  measure equals the numnber
of product segments in which a firm operates where a product segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code
industry. The  geographical diversification measure equals the  foreign sales-to-sales ratio  of  the firm.
Excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual market-to assets ratio to its
imputed market-to-assets ratio. The imputed market-to-assets ratio is the market-to-assets value of the
median single activity firm with no foreign sales that operates in the same primary industrial segment as
measured on a  2-digit SIC level and has more than $20 million in assets and sales. We include country
dummies but these are not reported. The p-value of the t-test of  equality of  the coefficient to zero  is
reported in parentheses. We use heteroskedasticity-corrected  standard errors.
Conditional  tests of the Investment  impact  of:
T  __________________________  =Geographical  diversification  Industrial  diversification
Variable  Single-Activity  Multi-activity  Domestic  Multinational
firms only  firms only  firms  only  firms only
Intercept  -0.102  -0.211  0.032  -0.220
(0.82)  (0.53)  (0.96)  (0.42)
Industrial diversification  - 0.036  0.070  0.053
(0.40)  (0.27)  (0.09)
Geographical diversification  0.180  0.234  - 0.064
(0.35)  (0.07)  (0.70)
Log of total assets (t-l)  0.012  -0.003  -0.031  0.012 
(0.72)  (0.89)  (0.50  (0.62')
Excess value (t-l)  0.135  0.260  0.380  0.184
(0.09)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Adjusted R2  0.05  0.09  0.07  0.07
Number of observations  463  1241  592  1112
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